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Summers v. Earth Island Institute: Overhauling the
Injury-in-Fact Test for Standing to Sue
"To seek injunctive relief a plaintiff must show that he is
under threat of suffering 'injury in fact' that is concrete
andparticularized;the threatmust be actualand imminent,
not conjecturalor hypothetical. . . . "

"To the contrary, a threat offuture harm may be realistic
even where the plaintiffcannot specify precise times, dates,
and GPS coordinates."2
I. INTRODUCTION

Following the stringent standing test applied by the United
States Supreme Court in Summers v. Earth Island Institute,
environmental organizations will never meet the standing
requirements necessary to challenge regulations that prevent public
notice, comment, and appeal of United States Forest Service
projects.3 Without an available plaintiff to challenge these projects,
the Forest Service will continue to cut down trees throughout the
national forests without the threat of public protest.4 The standing
test applied by the Summers majority must be replaced with a new
test that provides a potential plaintiff with an actual opportunity to
establish standing to challenge the Forest Service's ability to
negatively impact the environment without public interference.
Alleging aesthetic and procedural injuries, the plaintiff
organizations in Summers challenged a sale of timber from a
national forest because the United States Forest Service refused to
provide notice and an opportunity for public comment and appeal
before the sale.5 The district court granted a preliminary injunction
applicable nationwide, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.6 The Supreme Court of the United States,
Copyright 2011, by MARGARET MCDONALD.

1. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009) (citing
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
180-81 (2000)).
2. Id. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
3. Id at 1147 (majority opinion).
4. The United States Forest Service admits that it has planned "thousands"
of projects exempted from notice, comment, and appeal for the future. Id at
1157 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 1147 (majority opinion).
6. Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999 (E.D. Cal.
2005), aff'd sub nom. Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 459 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.
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however, declined to rule on the merits.7 Instead, the Court held
that the environmental organizations lacked standing to sue the
Forest Service because the organizations failed to prove an
"imminent" threat of injury.8
The Court reached the wrong result in Summers. This decision
highlights an inconsistency in how the Supreme Court determines
injury in fact in environmental standing cases. The demanding
imminent-threat test applied by the Summers majority prevents
environmental organizations like those in Summers from
demonstrating the injury-in-fact aspect of standing under Article
III of the United States Constitution.9 Although the dissent offers a
more equitable test that requires a "realistic threat" of injury, this
test demands too little from potential plaintiffs.' 0 Summers
demonstrates the need to modify the analysis applied to the injuryin-fact prong of the three-part standing test for both aesthetic
injuries and procedural injuries. New injury-in-fact tests will
provide environmental organizations with broader opportunities to
establish standing to challenge procedural regulations and
proposed projects that negatively impact the environment.
This Note argues that courts should adopt new analyses for
determining injury in fact, especially when the potential plaintiff
alleges a procedural injury. Part II provides a background on
Article III standing and United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
that discusses standing in the context of environmental cases. Part
III describes the Summers litigation in detail, including Justice
Scalia's majority opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurrence, and
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion. Part IV analyzes the factors
that the majority and dissent used to determine whether a plaintiff
has standing to sue. More specifically, Part IV focuses on the
injury-in-fact requirement of standing because the majority and
dissent employ conflicting tests when analyzing this factor. It also
2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 490 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 2007), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009);
Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 690-91 (9th Cir. 2007), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142

(2009).
7. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1153.
8. Id. at 1151 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564
(1992)).
9. Id. at 1149 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)). Courts apply a three-part test in
standing cases: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Id. For a discussion
of the three-part standing test, see infra Part II.A.
10. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1000 (1982)).
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emphasizes the problems with applying the same test to both
aesthetic and procedural standing. In response to these problems,
Part IV proposes several new tests to replace the current injury-infact test applied by the Summers majority. Part V of this Note
concludes that courts should adopt a modified application of the
injury-in-fact tests for aesthetic injuries and a due process-like
analysis for procedural injuries. Part V further concludes that under
these proposed tests, plaintiffs like those in Summers will have an
actual opportunity to establish standing in order to challenge
aesthetic and procedural injuries in environmental cases.

1I. A HISTORY OF ARTICLE III STANDING AND ITS ROLE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE

Litigation concerning standing of environmental groups did not
originate with Summers." In fact, environmental case law
represents one of the only areas of law in which the courts question
whether a plaintiff has standing to sue. In most cases, the courts
never raise the issue of standing because the plaintiffs demonstrate
obvious injuries.12 The development of Article III standing and
environmentally based jurisprudence preceding Summers set a
foundation for evaluating the Court's analysis of standing in the
case.
A. Article III and Standing
To establish standing to sue, a plaintiff must "allege[] such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" that a court has
jurisdiction to afford the plaintiff a remedy.13 In other words, the
plaintiff must have a cause of action or a legal right to bring a
suit.14 When determining whether a plaintiff can establish standing
and proceed with a suit, courts today consider three factors: (1) that
11. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Friends of the Earth,
528 U.S. 167; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998);
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555; Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S.
871 (1990); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
12. See Emily Longfellow, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services: A New Look at Environmental Standing, 24 ENvIRONs 3, 14 (2000).
Financial and physical injuries are easily demonstrated injuries in fact. See id. at
15. Emotional and aesthetic injuries are more difficult to demonstrate. See id
For a discussion of the two types of injuries relevant to Summers-aesthetic and
procedural injuries-see infra Part II.A.
13. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
14. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizens, "Injuries,"
andArticle III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 170 (1992).
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the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact, (2) that the defendant's
actions caused the plaintiffs injury, and (3) that the court has the
means to provide redress to the injured plaintiff.' 5 Although courts,
including the Supreme Court in Summers, readily apply these three
factors today, this test is relatively new. The Court first recognized
injury in fact, causation, and redressability as requirements for
standing to sue in the 1970s.16
The common law idea of standing originated in England under
the tradition of the writ system.' 7 More specifically, the writ of
locus standi'8 in prohibition and certiorari provided "that 'a
stranger' ha[dJ9 standing, but relief in suits by strangers [was]
discretionary." Under this broad writ system, "[a]nyone could
bring the writ" of prohibition, and the "writ of certiorari was
similarly available to citizens, and not just those with a concrete or
personal interest."20 This extensive grant of standing in the English
writ system influenced the creation of the American injury-in-fact
test.2 1
The constitutional law doctrine of standing originates in Article
IH, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which states that
"the judicial Power shall extend" to "Cases" and "Controversies." 22

15. Id. at 168; see Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.
16. Sunstein, supranote 14, at 168.
17. Id. at 171. The writ system originated in the medieval English courts of
Westminster. Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 819 (1969). Writs "were
conceived as public proceedings brought in the King's name" and served as the
means for people to bring their cases to the proper jurisdictions. Louis L. Jaffe,
Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265,
1269 (1961); see Berger, supra,at 818.
18. "The principle of locus standi is that there is something in the bill which,
if passed into law, would injure the parties petitioning." A.H.B. Constable,
Principlesand PracticeAffecting Locus Standi, 9 JURID. REV. 47, 55 (1897).
19. Jaffe, supra note 17, at 1274.
20. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 171.
21. Id. at 172. In 1697, English courts allowed a "stranger," i.e., person

without a "personal interest," to bring a writ of mandamus to "compel justices of

the peace 'to make rates for the relief of the poor."' Berger, supra note 17, at
824 (quoting Lidleston v. Mayor of Exeter, (1697) 90 Eng. Rep. 567 (K.B.)).
For an example of the application of the writ system in American courts, see
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), where Marbury filed a writ
of mandamus with the Supreme Court asking the Court to command Madison to
deliver Marbury's appointment as a justice of the peace.
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Court in Muskrat v. United States
explained that a "case" is "a suit instituted according to the regular course of
judicial procedure," and a "controvers[y] . . . includes only suits of a civil
nature." 219 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1911) (quoting In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F.
241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
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However, the word "standing" is not found in the Constitution-it is
a judicial construct. 23 The Supreme Court looked to the writ system
of common law England to create a vehicle to limit the jurisdiction
of the Court as an extension of the separation of powers doctrine. 24
Before the 1920s, "there was no separate standing doctrine at all"
because "[n]o one believed that the Constitution limited Congress'
power to confer a cause of action." 25
The Supreme Court first acknowledged a standing requirement
in the 1923 case of Frothinghamv. Mellon, in which a unanimous
Court refused to entertain an individual taxpayer's alleged cause of
action.2 6 A Massachusetts taxpayer brought suit to challenge the
Maternity Act of 1921 on the grounds that its enforcement would
result in "taxation for illegal purposes." 27 The Court explained that
the taxpayer failed to show that she "sustained or [was]
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury" from the
enforcement of the Maternity Act. 2 Furthermore, the Court added
that taxpayers in general could not bring a suit where they
"suffer[ed] in some indefinite way in common with people
generally." 29 Despite the Court's reference to the "cases and
controversies" provision of Article III, Section 2, the decision in
Frothingham "left uncertain whether 'standing'
was a
constitutional requirement or simply a 'rule of self-restraint."' 30
In the 1930s and 1940s, Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter
began to "develop a range of devices designed to limit the
occasions for judicial intervention into the democratic process" to
protect "New Deal legislation from frequent judicial attack." 3 1
These devices became the foundation for the current interpretation
of standing. 32 When citizens tried to use the Constitution as a

interpreted this "case or controversy" requirement as a limit on judicial power.
Id. at 356.
23. Berger, supra note 17, at 818.
24. Id.
25. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 170. This directly reflects the writ system of
England where "strangers" could bring suit regardless of whether they had a
personal stake in the claim.

26. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
27. Id. at 487. The Maternity Act provided grants to states that enacted
programs to help "reduce maternal and infant mortality and protect the health of
mothers and infants." Id. at 479.
28. Id. at 488.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 480; Berger, supra note 17, at 816 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392

U.S. 83, 92 (1968)).
31. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 179.
32. Id.
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means of challenging New Deal legislation, 33 the Supreme Court
"held that there was no personal stake for the invocation of judicial
power."3 4 In 1946, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure
Act, which stated that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof."35 These ideas of a "legal wrong" and a person
"adversely affected or aggrieved" became the foundation of the
injury-in-fact requirement for standing to sue.3 6
The three elements of the standing test applied in Summersinjury in fact, causation, and redressability-first appeared in
Supreme Court decisions during the 1970s. As an expansion of the
traditional interpretation of a legal wrong, 37 the Court first applied
an injury-in-fact test in the 1970 decision Ass'n ofData Processing
Organizations v. Camp. In this case, the Court rejected the idea
that a plaintiff must show a "legal wrong" to establish standing;
instead, the Court stated that an "aggrieved" party can suffer an
injur in fact under the terms of the Administrative Procedure
Act. The Court held that the plaintiffs suffered economic injuries
in fact but also stated that non-economic injuries may constitute an
injury in fact in other cases.4 0
Following Ass'n of Data ProcessingOrganizations,the Court
began to entertain cases involving other types of injuries. In the
first environmental standing case, Sierra Club v. Morton,41 the
Court recognized that aesthetic injuries, as well as economic,
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. 4 2 The Court explained that
"[a]esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic wellbeing, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society,
and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by
33. See Frothingham,262 U.S. 447 (examining taxpayers' challenges of the
enforcement of the Maternity Act).
34. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 180.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
36. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 181-82.
37. The Court first applied this idea of a "legal wrong" in cases dealing with
statutory standing where a plaintiff's legal right was violated. Id. The Court later
used the language of "or adversely affected or aggrieved" to expand the doctrine
of standing to constitutionally based cases. Id. at 181-83.
38. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
39. Id. at 152, 153. Plaintiffs in Ass'n of Data Processing Organizations
alleged economic injuries when the Comptroller of the Currency allowed
national banks to "make data processing services available to other banks and
bank customers." Id. at 151.
40. Id. at 152.
41. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see infra Part II.B.
42. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734.
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the many. . . does not make them less deserving of legal protection

through the judicial process." 43 Also during the 1970s, the Court
began to recognize procedural injuries in fact." In administrative
law, the Supreme Court often found that plaintiffs suffered
procedural injuries in fact when an agency "refus[ed] to grant a
petitioner a statutorily or constitutionally required procedure, e.g.,
a hearing."45 In these cases, the Court rarely mentioned standing to
sue and accepted the plaintiffs claim that the "contested fact ...
might plausibly be resolved differently after a hearing."4 6 Although
the Court specifically recognized aesthetic injuries and procedural
injuries as potential injuries in fact, the broad language in Ass'n of
Data Processing Organizations leaves open the possibility for
other categories of injuries in fact.
The Court added the second element of the three-part standing
test-redressability-in the 1975 case Warth v. Seldin, stating that
standing rests on whether the plaintiff 'alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to . . . justify exercise
of the court's remedial powers on his behalf."A In other words, the
Court must have the ability to redress the injury in fact alleged by
the plaintiff. If no remedy exists, the plaintiff has not alleged an
actual Article III "case or controversy.'
49
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,
the Court presented the final element of the three-part standing
test--causation. In this 1976 case, the Court explained that to
establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury "can
be traced to the challenged action of the defendant."o In other
words, the injury in fact cannot "result[] from the independent
action of some third party not before the court." 5 ' In Simon, the
Court revisited the requirements of injury in fact and redressability,
43.
44.
ADMIN.
45.
46.

Id.
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Making Sense of Procedural Injury, 62
L. REv. 1, 2 (2010).
Id.
Id.
47. 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975). Warth is an example of a case based on
constitutional injury, not statutory injury. For a discussion of statutory injury,
see supra note 37.
48. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99.
49. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). The plaintiffs in this case, several indigent
organizations, challenged an Internal Revenue Ruling that presented "favorable
tax treatment" to nonprofit hospitals that only provided emergency room
services, but no other hospital services, to indigents. Id. at 455. Simon is an

example of a case based on constitutional injury, not statutory injury. See supra
note 37.
50. Simon, 426 U.S. at 41.
51. Id. at 42.
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thereby presenting the three elements that became the foundation
for the Court's analysis of standing in the environmental cases that
precede Summers.
B. EnvironmentalJurisprudenceLeading Up to Summers
Despite the gradual development of constitutionally based
standinq to sue, standing remained a seldom-raised issue in the
courts. However, one area of law in which the Court often
analyzed standing was environmental law. Summers is the latest
case in a wavering line of jurisprudence in which the Supreme
Court has determined whether a plaintiff who opposes
governmental action on environmental grounds has standing to
sue. In some cases the Court held that the plaintiff lacked
standing, 53 but in others, the Court found that the plaintiff met the
requirements to establish standing to sue.54 These cases illustrate
the applicability of the three-part standing test to different factual
situations.
In Sierra Club, the Supreme Court first recognized the
possibility that an environmental organization could sue for
aesthetic injuries.s Members of the Sierra Club filed suit against
the United States Forest Service when the Forest Service granted
Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc. (Disney) permission to develop a
resort in the Mineral King Valley,5 an "area of great natural
beauty nestled in the Sierra Nevada Mountains" in California.5 7
Members of the Sierra Club wanted the Mineral King Valley to
remain a place for recreational activities.5 8 At trial, the district
court granted the Sierra Club a preliminary injunction against the
Disney development. 59 However, in a three-to-four decision,6 0 the
52. See Robin Kundis Craig, Standing and Environmental Law: An Overview
(Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 425, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfr?abstract-id= 1536583.
53. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n,
497 U.S. 871 (1990); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
54. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
55. 405 U.S. 727; see supra Part II.A.
56. The Mineral King Valley is part of the Sequoia National Forest, which
is the location of the Burnt Ridge Project in Summers. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at
728. Both Sierra Club and Summers involved challenges to United States Forest
Service projects in the Sequoia National Forest. See infra Part III.A.
57. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 728-30.
58. Id. at 728-30, 734-35.
59. Id. at 728-31.
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Court held that the Sierra Club failed to allege any injury in fact
because the organization did not demonstrate that "it or its
members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by
the Disney development." 6 1 The Court explained that the injury-infact test "requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest"the "party seeking review [must be] among the injured." 62
The following year, the Supreme Court adopted its broadest
grant of standing to sue in environmental jurisprudence in United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP).6 3 In this case, environmental organizations challenged
the Interstate Commerce Commission's "failure to suspend" an
increased tariff on railroad freight.64 The plaintiffs alleged that the
increased rate injured them economically, recreationally, and
aestheticall because it "would discourage the use of 'recyclable'
agreed with the
materials." 5 A six-to-two majority 6
environmental organizations, but the Court also noted that the
"alleged injury to the environment [in SCRAP] [was] far less direct
and perceptible" than that in Sierra Club.6 7 Nonetheless, the Court
still found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue because they
"alleged a specific and perceptible harm that distinguished them
from other citizens who had not used the natural resources that
were claimed to be affected."6 8
Following the broad interpretation of injury in fact in SCRAP,
standing to sue was only a minor hurdle for plaintiffs in
environmental cases until 17 years later in Lujan v. National

60. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not take part in the consideration or
decision of the case because the case was argued on November 17, 1971, and
they did not join the Court until January 7, 1972. See Members of the Supreme
Court of the United States, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/members.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
61. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735.
62. Id. at 734-35.

63. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
64. Id. at 675.
65. Id. at 676. The plaintiffs alleged that the increased rate injured them
economically because the group members were "forced to pay more for finished
products." Id. They also alleged that it injured them recreationally and
aesthetically because "unnecessary destruction of timber and extraction of raw
materials . .. and the accumulation of otherwise recyclable solid and liquid
waste materials" prevented the organization members' use of forests and
streams. Id.
66. Justice Powell took no part in the case. Id. at 699.
67. Id. at 688.
68. Id. at 689-90.
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Wildlife Federation. In this case, the Court began to restrict the
opportunities for environmental organizations to establish standing
to sue. 70 The plaintiff organizations challenged the land-use
designations made by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM),
arguing that these designations injured them because "open[ing]
the lands up to mining activities [would] destroy[] [the land's]
natural beauty."' Furthermore, two members of the plaintiff
organization claimed to use land "in the vicinity" of the challenged
actions. 72
In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the plaintiffs did
not establish standing to challenge the land-use programs. 73
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia declared that the plaintiffs
failed to "refer to a single BLM order or regulation" and instead
generalized the "continuing (and thus constantly changing)
operations of the BLM."7 The majority concluded that the
plaintiffs failed to allege a specific or "identifiable" action that
caused them injury. 75 Responding to this reasoning by the
69. 497 U.S. 871 (1990). There is another important environmental case
where the petitioner is Manuel Lujan, Jr., the Secretary of the Interior: Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). To avoid confusion, these cases will
be referred to by the names of the respondents.
70. During the interim between SCRAP and National Wildlife Federation,
Justice Scalia joined the Court in 1986. See Members of the Supreme Court of
the United States, supra note 60. Beginning in National Wildlife Federation,
Justice Scalia led an effort to limit potential plaintiffs' opportunities to establish
standing. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871. This narrowing closely follows
an approach to standing that then-Judge Scalia announced in a 1983 law review
article that he wrote while on the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881
(1983). Then-Judge Scalia explained that there are two types of cases. The first
is "when an individual who is the very object of a law's requirement or
prohibition seeks to challenge it." Id. at 894. In these cases, then-Judge Scalia
stated that the plaintiff "always has standing." Id. The second type of case arises
when a "plaintiff is complaining of an agency's unlawful failure to impose a
requirement or prohibition upon someone else." Id. Then-Judge Scalia argued
that in this second type of case, the plaintiff must show that he was "harmed
more than the rest of us" as a "prerequisite for judicial intervention." Id. at 89495. He explained that standing "is an essential means of restricting the courts."
Id. at 895. To limit the judiciary's control over governmental action, then-Judge
Scalia urged that "'concrete injury' . . . is the indispensible prerequisite of
standing." Id He explained that this injury "separate[s] the plaintiff from all the
rest of us." Id.
71. Nat'I Wildlfe Fed'n,497 U.S. at 879.
72. Id. at 880.
73. Id. at 899.
74. Id. at 890.
75. Id. at 890 n.2. The Court not only found that the plaintiffs lacked standing,
but it also noted that their case was not yet ripe for review. Id. at 891-92.
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majority, the dissent argued that "[a]lthough the affidavits were not
models of precision, . . . they were adequate at least to create a

genuine issue of fact as to the organization's injury."76
Two years after National Wildlife Federation,the Court further
narrowed the requirements to establish Article III standing to sue
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife." In this case, the Defenders of
Wildlife argued that the Endangered Species Act should apply
outside of the United States.7 8 Some of the organization's members
asserted that they wanted to go overseas to see endangered animals
and feared that, without the protection of the Endangered Species
Act, there would be no animals to see.7 9 A six-to-three majority
held that the Defenders of Wildlife lacked standing because they
failed to demonstrate injury in fact and redressability.8 0
In this case, Justice Scalia again wrote the majority opinion.
He emphasized that prior Supreme Court cases "established that
the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three
elements." 82 First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he "suffered
an 'injury in fact."'83 This injury in fact must be "concrete and
particularized," 84 and "actual or,86imminent,s 8 5 and must not be
66
Second, the plaintiff must
or "hypothetical.'
conjectural"
demonstrate a "causal connection between the injury and the
conduct" of the defendant.8 7 Third, the courts must be able to
"redress" the injury "by a favorable decision."88
Applying the three-part test to the facts of the case, Justice
Scalia explained that the organization's members did not allege
76. Id. at 901 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
78. Id. at 557-58.
79. Id. at 557-58, 564.
80. Id. at 578.
81. Notably, Justice Scalia also wrote the majority opinion in Summers. See
infra Part III.B. Furthermore, the year following Defenders of Wildhife, thenPrincipal Deputy Solicitor General John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote an article
defending Justice Scalia's opinion in Defenders of Wildlife. See John G. Roberts,
Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219 (1993). Chief
Justice Roberts also joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Summers. See
infra note 146.
82. Defenders of Wildlfe, 504 U.S. at 560.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41 n.16
(1972)).
85. Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 557-58 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38, 43 (1976)).
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facts that demonstrated that they were among the injured because
they had not been "deprived of the opportunity to observe animals
of the endangered species." 89 Furthermore, the majority stated that
the plaintiffs failed to present a "description of concrete plans" or
"any specification of when" they planned to travel. 90 Justice Scalia
added that the Court had "consistently held that a plaintiff raising
only a generally available grievance about government . . . does

not state an Article III case or controversy."
Falling in line with the Lujan cases, the Supreme Court once
again applied a narrow view of standing in Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Environment.92 In this case, a group of citizens "interested
in environmental protection" filed suit against a manufacturing
company alleging that the company violated the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act when it failed to
file "requisite hazardous-chemical inventory and toxic-chemical
release forms." 93 A unanimous Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Scalia, held that the plaintiffs had not established standing
because the Court could not remedy any of the alleged injuries.
This case provides an example of where the Court focused on
redressability instead of injury in fact when determining whether
the plaintiff had standing to sue.
Departing from the trend of majority opinions written by
Justice Scalia, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.q Justice Ginsburg wrote the
opinion for a seven-to-two Court. The majority applied the
Defenders of Wildlife standing test and held that Friends of the
Earth established standing to bring suit on behalf of its members. 96
The plaintiffs in this case alleged that Laidlaw violated the Clean
Water Act by discharging pollutants into the water. 97 The majority
insisted that the plaintiffs properly demonstrated injury in fact
through several detailed affidavits of Friends of the Earth
members. 98 Justice Scalia disagreed; his dissent argued that the
plaintiff organization failed to demonstrate a "concrete and
89. Id. at 564.
90. Id
91. Id. at 573-74.
92. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
93. Id at 86, 88.
94. Id. at 105-06.
95. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
96. Id at 180-88.
97. Id. at 174-76.
98. Id. at 181-83. One affidavit detailed the experience of an organization
member who could not picnic near a local river because the discharge from the
Laidlaw facility polluted the water. Id. at 181-82.
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particularized" injury in fact. 99 He argued that the plaintiffs only
alleged "general" injuries instead of "'specific facts' to support
their claims."100 With the jurisprudentially unique combination of
the majority finding standing and Justice Scalia dissenting, Friends
of the Earth suggested a shift away from the Court's narrow
application of the injury-in-fact test in environmental standing
cases.
Most recently, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court examined
whether the State of Massachusetts had standing to challenge
actions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).' 0 The
EPA allegedly abdicated its responsibility under the Clean Air Act
to regulate the emissions of four greenhouse gases.' 0 2 The State of
Massachusetts argued that these emissions led to an elevation of
the sea level, which then caused detrimental erosion to the state's
coastline.10 3 The Court held, in a five-to-four decision, that
Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA.104 The majorityo
found that the rise in sea levels caused by global warming had
already harmed, and would continue to harm, the State of
Massachusetts.10 6 The Court noted that the "risk of catastrophic
harm" due to the coastal erosion, "though remote, [was]
nevertheless real." 0 7
The dissent 0 8 argued that "[r]elaxing Article III standing
requirements because asserted injuries are pressed by a State . . .
has no basis in our jurisprudence."l0 9 The dissenters stated that
"the status of Massachusetts as a State cannot compensate for
petitioners' failure to demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and
99. Id. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
100. Id. (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561).
101. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
102. Id. at 505. The Court explained that "[r]espected" scientific research
showed a causal connection between the increased levels on carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere and a the "rise in global temperatures." Id. at 504-05.
103. Id. at 523-24.
104. Id. at 526-27.
105. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Notably, Justice Kennedy is the only justice to be
in the majority in both Massachusetts and Summers. See infra note 108.
106. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522-23.
107. Id. at 526.
108. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito. Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note that these four
justices, joined with Justice Kennedy, comprise the majority in Summers. See
infra Part III.
109. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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redressability.""l 0 In other words, the dissent suggested that the
majority applied the standing test more leniently in Massachusetts
because the plaintiff was a sovereign state. The dissent urged that
Massachusetts failed to show a "particularized" injury because
global warming is "global" and, therefore, cannot be an
individualized injury to Massachusetts."'
This brief history of jurisprudence demonstrates that the issue
of standing in environmental cases often divides the Court and that
the disagreements on the Court repeatedly focus on whether the
plaintiff satisfied the injury-in-fact element of the test for standing.
This trend continues with the Court's five-to-four split in Summers.

III. SUMMERS

V. EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE

Summers continues the Court's inconsistent application of the
injury-in-fact test in environmental jurisprudence. The specific
facts of the case, the procedural history, and the injury-in-fact tests
applied by both the majority and the dissent demonstrate the need
to reconsider how the Supreme Court analyzes standing to sue.
Although the majority repeats the traditional injury-in-fact test, the
dissent presents a broader test for establishing standing to sue.
A. FactualandProceduralBackground
In the summer of 2002, a wildfire burned 150,700 acres of the
1.2 million acre Sequoia National Forest in California.11 2 A year
after this fire, the largest in the forest's history, the United States
Forest Service approved a salvage sale of timber on land damaged
by the fire."' 3 In response, several non-profit environmental
organizations concerned with conservation of the Sequoia National
Forest objected to this logging project.114
110. Id. at 540.
111. Id. at 541. The dissent also noted that Massachusetts failed to
demonstrate a causal connection between specific EPA-controlled emissions and
the erosion of the coastline. Id. at 544-45. Additionally, the dissent found that
there was no opportunity for redressability in this case because emissions from
other countries added to the problem of global warming, and the EPA only
controls domestic emissions. Id. at 545.
112. McNally Fire Area Restoration Project, U.S. FOREST SERVICE,
http://www.fs.fed.us/r5/sequoia/projects/mcnallyfire/mcnallyfire-restoration.h
tml (last modified Jan. 23, 2007).
113. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1147 (2009); McNally
FireArea RestorationProject,supra note 112.
114. Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 2007),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct.
1142 (2009).
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Prior to 1992, the Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals
Reform Act ("ARA")'l 5 established an administrative appeals
process by which the United States Forest Service provided notice
and an opportunity for public comment and appeal.116 However,
the Forest Service passed new regulations in 1992117 that exempted
certain activities, including fire-rehabilitation activities on less than
4,200 acres and salvage-timber sales on less than 250 acres, from
the notice, comment, and appeal process.' 18 Pursuant to these new
exemptions, the Forest Service conducted a salvage sale of timber
on 238 acres and did not provide a means for notice or the
opportunity for public comment and appeal on the project.119 The
United States Forest Service referred to this project as the "Burnt
Ridge Project."l 20
Instead of launching a facial challenge to the regulations when
promulgated in 1992, Earth Island Institute, joined by four other
non-profit environmental organizations 2 1 waited 11 years to file
suit against the United States Forest Service.1 The plaintiffs
alleged that the Forest Service failed to apply certain ARA
regulations to the Burnt Ridg Project that would allow for public
notice, comment, and appeal.
Affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs alleged aesthetic and
procedural injuries caused by the absence of an opportunity for
notice of and to comment on United States Forest Service
projects.124 One affidavit explained that Sequoia ForestKeeper
member Ara Marderosian repeatedly visited the Burnt Ridge site

115. Pub. L. No. 102-381, 106 Stat. 1419 (1992).
116. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1147.
117. 36 C.F.R. § 215.4(a) (2010) (discussing notice and comment); id. §
215.12(f) (discussing appeal).
118. Notice of Final National Environmental Policy Act Implementing
Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,814, 33,824 (June 5, 2003). Although the United
States Forest Service did not announce a reason for amending the regulations to
exempt certain projects from notice, comment, and appeal, perhaps the Forest
Service wanted to save time and money by limiting these administrative
procedures. For further discussion of potential motives for the amendments, see
infra Part IV.B.2.
119. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1148.
120. Id at 1147.
121. The plaintiffs in Summers were five environmental groups: the Earth
Island Institute; the Sequoia ForestKeeper; Heartwood, Inc.; the Center for
Biological Diversity; and the Sierra Club. Id. at 1154 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1148 (majority opinion).
123. Id. These regulations were 36 C.F.R. § 215.4(a) (discussing notice and
comment) and 36 C.F.R § 215.12(f) (discussing appeal). Summers, 129 S. Ct. at
1147.
124. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1158 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and had plans to do so again in the near future.125 Marderosian
argued that the Forest Service going forward with the Burnt Ridge
Project would harm his interests in viewing the flora and fauna of
the area.126 Marderosian also explained that he wanted to comment
on the Burnt Ridge project but did not have an opportunity to do so
because of the exemptions under the amended regulations.' 2 7
Although the Marderosian affidavit focused only on the Burnt
Ridge project, the Bensman affidavit did not allege injuries
specific to the Burnt Ridge Project.128 Heartwood, Inc. member
and employee Jim Bensman argued that he visited many national
forests in the past and that he planned to visit more in the future.129
Bensman's affidavit specifically referred to a series of projects in
the Allegheny National Forest in PennsyIvania that were subject to
the challenged regulations of the ARA.1 o
The plaintiff organizations initially brought suit to challenge
both the Burnt Ridge project and the regulations that exempted
notice, comment, and appeal.131 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction to prevent the execution of the Burnt Ridge
project. 132 Several months later, the parties settled the case and the
Forest Service withdrew plans for the Burnt Ridge project. 33
Despite the settlement, the District Court for the Eastern
District of California proceeded with the case, noting that the
Burnt Ridge timber sale was not at issue and that the court instead
would rule on the merits of the plaintiff organizations' challenges
to the Forest Service regulations.' 34 The court found that the
environmental organizations had standing to sue.1 3 5 The district
court explained that when plaintiffs "submit[] affidavits
concerning direct effects to the affiant's 'recreational, aesthetic,

125. Id. at 1149 (majority opinion).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1149-50.
129. Id. at 1150; Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 691 (9th
Cir. 2007), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
130. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1150.
131. Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999 (E.D. Cal.
2005), aff'd sub nom. Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 459 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.
2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 490 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 2007), affd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
132. Id.
133. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d at 692.
134. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1148; Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 999.
135. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
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and economic interests,' standing is appropriate."' 3 6 Reasoning
that the procedural regulations that excluded the notice, comment,
and appeals process for pr 3ojects like Burnt Ridge were invalid
the district court then invalidated
under federal regulations,
several of the Forest Service's regulations13 8 and called for a
nationwide injunction against the application of the regulations.13 9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
unanimously affirmed the district court's finding of standing and
issuance of the nationwide injunction against application of some
of the regulations.140 The court of appeals then held that other
regulations invalidated by the district court were not ripe for
review.1 4 1 It explained that affiant "Bensman's preclusion from
participation in the appeals process may yield diminished
recreational enjoyment of the national forests."I In other words,
the court stated that Bensman might suffer aesthetic injuries
because of his procedural injuries resulting from his inability to
appeal and therefore demonstrated an injury in fact.

136. Id at 1000 (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000)).
137. Id at 1004. These regulations stated that projects that affect "'land and
resource management plans . .. shall' be subject to notice, comment, and appeal
procedures." Id. at 1004 (emphasis added) (quoting Notice of Adoption of Final
Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,180, 43,208 (Sept. 18, 1992)).
138. The district court invalidated the following Forest Service regulations:
36 C.F.R. § 215.4(a) (excluding from notice and comment procedures
projects and activities that are categorically excluded from
documentation in an environmental impact statement (EIS) or
environmental assessment (EA)); 36 C.F.R. § 215.12(f) (excluding
from appeal procedures decisions that have been excluded from
documentation in an EIS or EA); 36 C.F.R. § 215.20(b) (exempting
from notice, comment, and appeal procedures decisions signed directly
by the Secretary); 36 C.F.R. § 215.10(a) (permitting delegation of the
determination that an emergency situation exists); and 36 C.F.R. §
215.18(b)(1) (providing that an appeal decision will be sent to
appellants five days after the decision is rendered).
Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
139. Pengilly, 376 F.Supp. 2d at 1011.
140. Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 690 (9th Cir. 2007),
aff'd in part, rev 'd in part sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct.
1142 (2009).
141. Id at 690-91. The court of appeals upheld the district court's
invalidation of 36 C.F.R. § 215.12(f) and 36 C.F.R. § 215.4(a). The court of
appeals vacated the district court's invalidation of the other regulations because
plaintiffs failed to show that "the other challenged regulations were applied in
the context of the Burnt Ridge Timber Sale or any other specified project."
Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d at 696.
142. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d at 693.
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
determine whether the plaintiff environmental organizations had
established standing to challenge the regulations at issue in the
timber sale and, if so, whether the nationwide injunction was
proper relief.14 3 A five-to-four majority held that the environmental
organizations lacked standing to bring suit against the United
States Forest Service.'" Because the plaintiff organizations failed
to establish the requisite standing to sue, the Court declined to
determine whether the nationwide injunction on the regulations

was proper relief.14 5
B. The Majority Opinion
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalial 46 explained that the
constitutional basis for standing comes from Article III of the
Constitution, which limits judicial power to "Cases" and
"Controversies." 4 7 He noted that the "traditional role of AngloAmerican courts" is to "prevent actual or imminently threatened
injury to persons caused by private or official violation of law." 4 8
Before deciding a case on the merits, courts must make sure that
the "plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court
jurisdiction."l 4
Justice Scalia repeated the Court's familiar three-part test for
establishing standing,' 5 0 stating that a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that he will "suffer" an "actual and imminent" injury in fact, (2)
that the injury is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's actions, and
(3) that the Court can "prevent or redress the injury."'' Applying
these requirements to the facts of Summers, Justice Scalia
determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove the required element
of injury in fact.1 He noted that the plaintiff organizations
"point[ed] to their members' recreational interest in the National
Forests" to "establish the concrete and particularized injury that
143. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148 (2009).
144. Id at 1149-50.
145. Id at 1153.
146. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Id. at 1146-47.
147. Id at 1148 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2); see supra Part II.A.
148. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1148.
149. Id. at 1149 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)).
150. These are the same requirements that Justice Scalia applied in
Defenders of Wildhfe. See supra Part II.B.
151. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1149 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)).
152. Id at 1151.
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standing requires." 5 3 The Court asserted, however, that
"generalized harm" to the national forests and the environment
alone does not create standing; "if that harm in fact affects the
recreational or even the mere aesthetic interests of the plaintiff,

that will suffice."

54

The Court found that the allegations in both the Marderosian
and Bensman affidavits relied on insufficiently specific facts.15 It
quickly rejected the harm alleged in the Marderosian affidavit as
an injury in fact because the affidavit consisted of injuries solely
related to the Burnt Ridge project.156 Justice Scalia noted that
because Marderosian's injury in fact was remedied when the
parties settled, it was "not at issue in this case."15 7
Following the dismissal of the injuries asserted in the
Marderosian affidavit, the majority turned its attention to the harm
alleged in the Bensman affidavit, 5 8 in which Jim Bensman
asserted both past and current injuries.159 First, Bensman alleged
that he "suffered injury in the past from development on Forest
Service land."l60 Justice Scalia explained that this alleged injury
failed to meet the injury-in-fact test "for several reasons: because it
was not tied to application of the challenged regulations, because it
d[id] not identify any particular site, and because it relate[d] to past
injury rather than imminent future injury."' 6 '
In addition to his assertions of past harm, Bensman also
claimed that in the future he intended to visit other national forests
that were subject to Forest Service regulations.' 62 The majority
denied these future plans as an injury in fact because Bensman
"fail[ed] to allege that any particular timber sale ... will impede a
specific and concrete plan . .. to enjoy the National Forests." 63 in
particular, the Court found fault with Bensman's lack of

153. Id. at 1149.
154. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 73436 (1972)).
155. Id. at 115-51.
156. Id. at 1149-50.
157. Id. (quoting Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999
(E.D. Cal. 2005)); see supra Part III.A.
158. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1150.
159. Id. at 115-51.
160. Id. at 1150.
161. Id.
162. Id. Bensman alleged that he made "hundreds" of visits to over 70
national forests and that he "probably commented on a thousand" Forest Service
projects before this case. Id. at 1157 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1150 (majority opinion).
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specificity'6 in his future plans.' Justice Scalia explained that a
"vague desire" to visit a national forest "is insufficient to satisfy
the requirement of imminent injury."l 66 Without a "concrete plan"
to visit places subject to Forest Service projects, the Court refused
to find "the 'actual or imminent' injury that [standing] cases

require."

67

Justice Scalia further noted that "[a]ccepting an intention to
visit the National Forests as adequate to confer standing to
challenge any Government action affecting any portion of those
forests would be tantamount to eliminating the requirement of
concrete, particularized injury in fact." 68 The Court concluded that
because the affidavit only showed that "Bensman 'want[ed] to go"'
and "d[id] not assert . . . any firm intention" to visit a national

forest, the plaintiff organizations failed to meet the burden of
proving injury in fact.
After rejecting the aesthetic injuries claimed in both
affidavits,1 70 the Court focused on the alleged procedural injuries
resulting from the elimination of the opportunity for public notice,
comment, and appeal.171 Justice Scalia stated that "deprivation of a
procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected b
the deprivation ... is insufficient to create Article III standing."I
The Court further stated that "[o]nly a 'person who has been
accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can
assert that right without meetiny all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy."" Noting his divergence from the
view on congressional grants of standing discussed in Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion, 174 Justice Scalia stated that "[i]t
makes no difference that the procedural right has been accorded by
Congress.""1s Justice Scalia added that "[u]nlike redressability ...

164. See supra Part I.B. Compare Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S.
871 (1990) (requiring specificity in alleged injuries), with Summers, 129 S. Ct.
1142 (requiring specificity in alleged injuries).
165. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1150.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1151 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564
(1992)).
168. Id. at 1150.
169. Id. (quoting Brief for the Petitioners at 6, Summers, 129 S. Ct. 1142
(No. 07-463), 2008 WL 976399).
170. Id. at 1150-51.
171. Id. at 1151.
172. Id.
173. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992)).
174. See infra Part III.C.
175. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1151.
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the requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III
jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute." 7 6
After determining that the plaintiff organizations failed to
demonstrate an imminent injury in fact, the majority characterized
the dissent's finding of standing as incorrect.' 7 The Court found
fault in the dissent's proposal of a "hitherto unheard-of test for
organizational standing: Whether, accepting the organization's
self-description of the activities of its members, there is a statistical
probability that some of those members are threatened with
concrete injury." 1 Justice Scalia urged that this new realisticthreat test "would make a mockery of ... prior cases" that require
"specific allegations establishing that at least one identified
member had suffered or would suffer harm." 7 9
Because the affidavits of the various members of the
environmental organizations failed to demonstrate an imminent
threat of either aesthetic or procedural injury, the Court held that
the plaintiffs did not establish the injury-in-fact prong of the threepart standing test.' 8 0 The majority made it clear that without actual
plans to visit a specific national forest affected by a future Forest
Service project, the plaintiff organizations could not establish
sufficient evidence of injury in fact and, thus, did not have
standing to sue.' 8 1
C. The ConcurringOpinion
In a very brief opinion, Justice Kennedy joined the majority
opinion in full and added a concise commentary on congressional
grants of procedural rights.182 He explained that "[t]his case would
present different circumstances if Congress had sought to provide
redress for a concrete injury 'iv[ing] rise to a case or controversy
Justice Kennedy pointed out that
where none existed before.'
"[n]othing in the [the Appeals Reform Act], however, indicates
Congress intended to identify or to confer some interest separate
and apart from a procedural right." 84 In other words, Justice
Kennedy suggested that Congress could amend the ARA to
provide standing for all potential plaintiffs. Under this amendment,
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1151-52.
Id. at 1149-50.
Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992)).
Id.
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the plaintiff organizations in Summers would automatically
establish standing. However, because Congress had not statutorily
granted standing to challenge procedural injuries under the ARA,
Justice Kennedy declined to find that the plaintiff organizations
established standing to sue.
D. The Dissenting Opinion
In the dissenting opinion,'8 Justice Breyer argued that the
plaintiff organizations met the injury-in-fact requirement and
therefore did have standing to sue. The dissent found fault in the
majority's requirement of imminent harm in its test for injury in
fact.' 8 7 Justice Breyer stated that this requirement was one "more
appropriately considered in the context of ripeness or the necessity
of injunctive relief."' 88 He explained that the imminent-injury
requirement is too "stringent" of an interpretation of the realisticthreat test enumerated in precedential cases. 8 9 Justice Breyer
suggested that "a threat of future harm may be realistic even where
the plaintiff cannot specify precise times, dates, and GPS
coordinates."'19 0 The dissent also drew a comparison to
Massachusetts, where although the harm to Massachusetts may not
have occurred for several decades, the Court still found sufficient
injury to establish standing.191
After explaining why the realistic-threat test does not require
an imminent threat of harm, the dissent applied its test to the facts
offered in the organization members' affidavits.192 Justice Breyer
pointed out that the plaintiffs' affidavits described several "thenpending Forest Service projects, all excluded from notice,
comment, and appeal and all scheduled to take place on parcels
that the plaintiff organizations' members use."' Justice Breyer
found that "[t]hese allegations and affidavits more than adequately
show a 'realistic threat' of injury to plaintiffs brought about by
reoccurrence of the challenged conduct-conduct that the Forest
Service thinks lawful and admits will reoccur [in the reasonably

185.
Souter,
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion, which Justices Stevens,
and Ginsburg joined. Id.at 1153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1153-54.
Id at 1155.
Id.
Id. at 1156 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1000 (1982)).
Id
Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
Id.
Id. at 1158.
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near future]."l 9 4 The dissent found that the plaintiff organizations
did establish standing.
The disagreement between the majority and dissent over how
to determine injury in fact falls in line with the jurisprudence of
environmental standing cases. This inconsistent application of the
injury-in-fact prong of the standing-to-sue test suggests the need to
reconsider how courts analyze standing and illustrates the need for
new injury-in-fact tests.
IV. CRITIQUES OF THE INJURY-IN-FACT TESTS APPLIED IN SUMMERS
AND PROPOSALS FOR NEW INJURY-IN-FACT TESTS FOR STANDING
TO SUE

The five-to-four split of the Court in Summers follows
consistently with the jurisprudence on standing to sue in
environmental cases.195 The jurisprudential pattern of the Court's
division on the issue of standing and the inconsistency in the
application of the injury-in-fact test suggest the need to reevaluate
the three-part test developed in Defenders of Wildlife.196 Following
the Court's decision in Summers, simply formulating a broad new
test under which to examine all allegations of injury in fact is not a
sufficient remedy. Instead, the Court should evaluate procedural
and aesthetic in uries separately and apply different, individualized
tests to each.'
The problems raised by all three opinions in
Summers demonstrate the consequences of adhering to the status
quo.
A. Critiqueof Summers
Although both the majority and the dissent offer explanations
of what a plaintiff must establish to prove injury in fact, neither the
imminent-threat test nor the realistic-threat test is appropriate for
cases like Summers where the plaintiffs received no notice of the
injury-causing event.1 98 The majority's test is too stringent and
prevents injured parties from bringing suit, and the dissent's test is
too broad and allows for non-injured parties to establish
194. Id. The Forest Service "conceded that it will conduct thousands of
exempted projects in the future." Id. at 1157.
195. See supra Part III.
196. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see supra Part
II.B.
197. Although the tests proposed in this Note apply only to aesthetic and
procedural injuries, the Court should reevaluate its analysis of injury in fact for
other types of injuries, as well.
198. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1148.
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standing.199 Furthermore, the majority and dissent apply their
respective standing tests to both procedural and aesthetic
injuries. 200 Because these injuries are different in nature, courts
should analyze them under individualized tests. Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion, however, takes a step in the right direction by
focusing solely on procedural injuries. 20 1
1. Critiqueof the Majority Opinion
The majority's imminent-threat requirement is too stringent a
test and leaves little, if any, opportunity for environmental groups
like the plaintiffs in Summers to establish standing in cases where
the plaintiffs cannot receive notice of a potential injury-causing
event. Although the majority presented a three-part standing test in
its opinion, 20 it only applied the injury-in-fact prong because it
found that none of the injuries alleged in the affidavits were, in
fact, injuries.20 3
Despite the faults of the test applied, the majority's analysis
was correct with respect to finding that the injuries alleged in the
Marderosian affidavit did not confer standing in Summers.204
Because the parties settled the issue of the Burnt Ridge project out
of court, the Summers Court could not further redress the injuries
alleged in the Marderosian affidavit.20 5 Therefore, the majority
properly found that all injuries alleged concerning the Burnt Ridge
project were not injuries in fact.
Conversely, the Bensman affidavit illustrates a deficiency of
the imminent-threat test applied by the majority. Affiant Bensman
asserted that he planned to visit national forests subjected to Forest
Service projects in the future.206 He added that the timber sales and
fire-rehabilitation projects would take away from his future visits
to the Allegheny National Forest. 207 Applying the imminent-threat
test, the majority found that these future travel plans "fail[ed] to
allege that any particular timber sale or other project . . . will

impede a specific and concrete plan of Bensman's to enjoy the

199. See supra Part III.D.
200. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1148-51 (majority opinion), 1154-58 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
201. See supra Part III.C.
202. See supra Part III.B.
203. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1151.
204. See supra Part III.B.
205. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1148.
206. Id. at 1150.
207. Id. at 1150; id. at 1157 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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National Forests."208 Additionally, the Court determined that
Bensman's affidavit "does not assert ... any firm intention to visit
209
[a national forest], saying only that Bensman 'want[s] to go."'
According to the majority, an injury cannot be imminent if the
plaintiff presents no proof of specific plans to travel to a forest that
will be affected by Forest Service projects.210
Although the Court correctly requires more from a plaintiff
than just a desire to visit a national forest sometime in the future,
the Court asks too much of a plaintiff by requiring exact travel
plans when the plaintiff has not received notice of the injurycausing event. Requiring plans to visit a specific location where an
injury-causing event will take place is reasonable. For example, the
court could require travel plans to a particular national forest where
the Forest Service admitted that excluded timber sales will occur.
However, requiring plans to visit a specific location within that
national forest is inequitable because the plaintiff has no means of
acquiring knowledge of the precise location of the Forest Service
project when the Forest Service does not provide notice of its
proposed projects.
Under the majority's test, future plaintiffs similarly situated to
the environmental organizations in Summers will never meet the
standing requirements. The land parcels that are exempt from
notice, comment, and appeal are very small-250 acres-in
relation to the size of a national forest.2 11 The imminent-threat test
presents a plaintiff with the almost impossible task of pinpointing
all of the exact locations that he or she might visit while in a
national forest. A potential plaintiff could only meet this task if he
or she had notice that provided such specific information of future
projects.
Furthermore, timber sales and fire rehabilitation activities
conducted in one area of a national forest could affect a visitor's
enjoyment of a nearby area in the forest. For example, noise from a
logging project will not remain isolated to the acres where the trees
are being cut down. Therefore, even if a plaintiff did not plan to
visit one of the specific acres subject to a Forest Service project, he
or she could still suffer aesthetic injuries as a result of the project.
Because the effects of the Forest Service projects may affect
acreage outside of the area devoted to the project, the majority's
208. Id. at 1150 (majority opinion).
209. Id. (quoting Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 169, at 6).
210. Id.
211. For example, the Sequoia National Forest, in which the Burnt Ridge
project occurred, is 1.2 million acres. McNally Fire Area Restoration Project,
supra note 112.
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requirement of showing plans to visit the specific locations where
projects are planned is flawed-a person might suffer an injury
even if he or she had not planned to visit that specific area of a
national forest. A broader requirement of showing plans to visit a
specific national forest, rather than a particular acre in the national
forest, would be more reasonable. 212
In addition to the inapplicability of the imminent-injury test to
Bensman's aesthetic injuries, the majority's analysis of injury in
fact is also flawed because it does not distinguish between
aesthetic and procedural injuries. The Bensman affidavit alleges
two different types of injuries-aesthetic, as discussed above, and
procedural, from not having the opportunity for notice, comment,
and appeal.2 13 As a result of the procedural injury, affiant Bensman
did not receive notice of the Forest Service projects in the
Allegheny National Forest or the Sequoia National Forest. Had he
received notice, he could have alleged more specific injuries in his
affidavit. If Bensman alleged his injuries with more particularity, it
is possible that the plaintiffs in Summers could have satisfied the
majority's imminent-injury test. However, because the procedural
injury affected the plaintiffs' ability to allege specific imminent
injuries, the Court should have examined each injury separately.
In the majority opinion of Summers, Justice Scalia did not
afford much attention to the procedural-injury issue, which
conflicts with his comment in Defenders of Wildlife that procedural
rights are "special."2 14 He noted in Defenders of Wildlife that "[t]he
person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his
concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the
This
normal standards for redressability and immediacy."
the
imminent-threat
would
relax
that
the
Court
statement suggests
requirement in Summers because of the allegations of procedural
injuries. However, after quoting this statement from Defenders of
Wildlife, Justice Scalia added that "[u]nlike redressability .

.

. the

requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III
jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute." 2 16 Because the
Court stopped its application of the three-part test after
determining that the plaintiff organizations failed to meet the
injury-in-fact prong of the test, the Court analyzed the procedural
injuries in the same manner as the aesthetic injuries and declined to
take redressability into account. Instead, the Court should have
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See infra Part IV.B.
Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1150-51.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
Id.
Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1151.
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afforded special analysis to the procedural injuries because they
are of a different nature than aesthetic injuries. However, the
acknowledgment that procedural injury is a "special" injury sets a
firm foundation for a more applicable injury-in-fact test.
2. Critiqueof the ConcurringOpinion
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion provides the basis for a
reasonable solution to the problem of procedural injurycongressional authorization of standing. In two sentences, 2 18
Justice Kennedy suggested that the Court could have found a
procedural injury if Congress statutorily "provide[d] redress" for
such an injury within the Appeals Reform Act.219 However,
Congress did not provide redress for injuries arising under the
ARA, which suggests that Congress did not intend for any person
to be able to challenge the Forest Service projects. 220 Although
Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests that he might find
standing under a factual situation where Congress authorized a
means for challenge and redress, this future intention does not
solve the problem at hand. 22 1 However, because Congress has not
statutorily granted standing, the courts must make the standing
determination.
3. Critiqueof the Dissenting Opinion
The Summers dissent recommended the realistic-threat test, a
test more equitable than the majority's imminent-threat test
because it provides an actual opportunity for a plaintiff to establish
217. See infra Part V.B.1.
218. Although his concurring opinion in Summers is very brief, Justice
Kennedy's unique voting history in environmental standing jurisprudence offers
more insight into his opinion in Summers. See supra note 105. Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Defenders of Wildlife is especially telling of
his views on standing to sue. Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that
under the facts of Defenders of Wildife, respondents did not establish standing;
however, he refused to "foreclose the possibility . . . that in different

circumstances" a plaintiff could demonstrate injury in fact. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
219. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
220. Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy's suggestion harkens back to the
traditional comprehension of standing as an illustration of the writ system where
anyone, including "strangers," could bring suit. See supra Part II.A. Within this
analogy, Congress's authorization of standing would represent a specific writ.
221. Justice Kennedy's suggestion of congressional authorization for
procedural injuries does not help formulate a workable test for aesthetic injury.
Furthermore, it does not provide a solution for cases involving procedural
injuries where Congress has not provided redress.
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standing. However, this test is not without fault. Where the
majority's injury-in-fact test is too restrictive, the dissent's test is
too broad.
The dissent attacked the majority's imminent-threat test and its
requirement that plaintiffs allege specific plans to visit a particular
parcel of land subject to Forest Service projects. 222 The dissent
explained that the majority in Summers misinterpreted the word
"imminent" as used by the Court in prior standing cases, stating
instead that former Courts interpreted the word "imminent" to
mean "'conjectural' or 'hypothetical' or otherwise speculative."2 23
This distinction is significant because a hypothetical imminentinjury test suggests that plaintiffs would only need to show that
they could be injured in the near future, but under the Summers
majority's non-hypothetical imminent-injury test, plaintiffs must
show that they will be injured in the near future. The dissent's
interpretation suggests that the Court intended a much broader
requirement and, therefore, a much lower burden for plaintiffs to
meet when alleging injuries.
Following this broad interpretation of prior standing cases, the
dissent suggested that the majority's interpretation of the injury-infact test is too "stringent" and that a more reasonable inqury is
whether there is a realistic threat of injury to the plaintiff. The
dissent stated that if an act occurred in the past and caused harm,
the "reoccurrence of the challenged activity would cause [the
plaintiff] harm 'in the reasonably near future."' 2 2 5 Therefore, under
the dissent's reasoning, the United States Forest Service's
admission that thousands of similar projects will occur in the future
is enough to demonstrate realistic injuries. 226
Although the dissent correctly suggested that the majority
demands too much from potential plaintiffs in terms of providing
information of future plans, the dissent's test does not require
enough from plaintiffs. 227 The realistic-threat test is too easily
satisfied and allows plaintiffs with very vague future plans to
establish standing to sue. 2 28
222. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1155-56.
224. Id. at 1156. The dissent adopted this realistic-threat test from the Court's
opinion in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 (1983).
225. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Lyons, 461
U.S. at 107).
226. Id. at 1157.
227. See infra Part IV.B..
228. This is especially true when the plaintiffs are organizations with
thousands of members. See infra note 229. With so many members, it is likely
that at least one could realistically be injured by the Forest Service projects.
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The dissent noted that the environmental organizations in
Summers have thousands of members 229 and that these members
participate in many activities in the national forests across the
United States.230 The dissent deduced that because of this fact,
"[t]he majority must therefore aree that 'at least one identified
member has suffered ... harm." ' However, in this statement, the
dissent employed faulty logic and pointed out a major weakness in
the plaintiff organizations' claim. Although at least one of the
thousands of members of the plaintiff organizations might visit a
parcel of land subject to Forest Service projects, the burden falls on
the plaintiffs to submit an affidavit detailing the plans of such a
member. 2 32 When the injuries alleged in the Marderosian affidavit
became moot following the settlement of the Burnt Ridge
project, 2 33 the plaintiff organizations should have amended their
complaint to add as plaintiff another organization member who had
actual glans to visit a national forest subject to a Forest Service
project. 3 4 The plaintiff organizations would have had a much
stronger case had they chosen more specific illustrations of
aesthetic injury.23 5
These failures by the plaintiff organizations illustrate the
problem that permeates all aspects of the Summers case-the
Forest Service did not provide plaintiffs with notice of the
proposed projects. Under the current regulations that exempt notice
on certain Forest Service projects, potential plaintiffs like those in
Summers cannot provide more detailed allegations of injury in fact
because they have no administrative means of receiving notice.
With notice from the United States Forest Service, the plaintiffs
could have prepared affidavits alleging injuries specific to a
particular Forest Service project.
Furthermore, like the majority, the dissent failed to
differentiate between aesthetic injuries and procedural injuries. The
dissent blurred the two injuries together and applied the realisticthreat test to both. Because the procedural injury of having no
229. The dissent noted that the Earth Island Institute has over 15,000
members, the Sequoia ForestKeepers have over 100 members, the Center for
Biological Diversity has over 5,000 members, and the Sierra Club has more than
700,000 members. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1154 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1157 (quoting Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 169, at 6).
232. Id at 1149 (majority opinion).
233. Id. at 1149-50.
234. See id. at 1157-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
235. For example, Bensman's affidavit could have shown that he planned to
travel to the Sequoia National Forest on a specific date to take pictures of the
damage caused by the wildfire.
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opportunity for notice affects that plaintiffs ability to allege
aesthetic injuries, the Court should analyze each injury separately.
Therefore, the Court needs to adopt new injury-in-fact tests for
both aesthetic and procedural injuries when analyzing if a plaintiff
has standing to sue.
B. ProposedSolutions
The stringent imminent-threat interpretation of injury in fact 236
should not apply to cases like Summers where the plaintiff has not
received notice of an injury-causing event. Under this test, the
environmental group, as a potential plaintiff, cannot procedurally
challenge, through comment and appeal, the validity of regulations
that prevent individuals and groups from commenting on actions of
the United States Forest Service that negatively impact the
environment. Although the dissent offers a more reasonable
standard to apply when determining whether an environmental
organization has standing, the realistic-threat test is not ideal in all
situations, especially in situations outside the realm of Summers
where potential plaintiffs did receive notice of potential injurycausing events.
Because there are two different types of injuries, aesthetic and
procedural, the Court should not apply the same standing test to
both injuries. For cases involving aesthetic injuries, two standing
tests should be available to potential plaintiffs, where the test
applied depends on whether the plaintiffs received notice of the
injury-causing event. These tests must strike an equitable middle
ground between the very narrow imminent-threat test and the
overly broad realistic-threat test. In cases involving procedural
injuries, a new method of determining whether a plaintiff has
standing must be applied; the procedural injury should be treated
like a procedural due process issue.

236. The proposed solution in this Note focuses solely on the injury-in-fact
prong of the three-part standing test. Because the majority and the dissent in
Summers both limit their analyses to the issue of injury in fact, and the
jurisprudential history demonstrates that previous standing disagreements
focused almost solely on the issue of injury in fact, causation and redressability
will not be discussed in the proposed solutions of this Note. See supra Part II.B.
Therefore, in the future, the Court should apply the proposed injury-in-fact tests
in conjunction with the requirements for causation and redressability. See supra
Part II.B.
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1. The Aesthetic Injury Test
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Summers offers an ideal
test for determining whether a plaintiff established standing
through an aesthetic injury in fact. Where the majority demands
proof that an injury will happen in the immediate future, the dissent
asks for some evidence that an injury could happen sometime in
the future. As previously discussed,2 37 both of these tests are
flawed because they are too polarized. When a plaintiff can receive
administrative notice of an impending injury-causing event, the
Court should hold the potential plaintiff to a higher standard of
proof of injury in fact than a plaintiff who cannot receive notice.
Therefore, the Court should make two tests available for plaintiffs
that allege aesthetic injuries-one that applies when plaintiffs have
notice of injury-causing events and the other for when plaintiffs
have no opportunity to receive notice.
a. The Testfor Aesthetic Injury with Actual Notice
In cases where plaintiffs have actual notice of an impending
injury-causing event, 238 the Court should place a higher burden of
proof on the plaintiff to demonstrate injury in fact. In these cases,
potential plaintiffs have access to information through
administrative notice that can be incorporated into affidavits to
prove specific imminent injuries. The Summers majority's test can
be applied equitably in circumstances where plaintiffs have "actual
they can meet
notice" 239 of aesthetic injury-causing events because
240
the high standard of proving specific allegations.
With actual notice, potential plaintiffs will be able to draft their
alleged injuries to include specific times and locations of when and
where the injury will occur. Had affiant Bensman received notice
from the Forest Service that a timber sale was planned for
September 12, 2003, on 238 specific acres of the Sequoia National
237. See supra Part IV.A.
238. In this Note, "actual notice" refers to administrative notice from a
government agency. It is possible that a potential plaintiff could receive notice
that is not actual notice. In other words, the plaintiff could informally learn of a
potential injury-causing event by means other than administrative notice. In this
situation, the test for aesthetic injury without actual notice should be applied as
discussed in Part IV.B.1.b, infra.
239. "Actual notice" means that an administrative organization provides
notice in a systematic way to the public.
240. These circumstances would be similar to the facts in Friends of the
Earth, where the Court found that the plaintiff organization's affidavits
presented sufficiently specific allegations of injury to warrant an opportunity for
standing. See supra Part II.B.
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Forest, Bensman easily could state in his affidavit that he planned
to visit those 238 acres of the Sequoia National Forest on
September 12, 2003. This specifically detailed affidavit could
easily meet the Summers majority's imminent-threat test for
determining injury in fact. Therefore, when a potential plaintiff
receives actual notice of a potential injury-causing event, the Court
should continue to apply the same imminent-threat test applied in
Summers because the plaintiff has the information needed to allege
specific and particular injuries in fact. 24 1
b. The Testfor Aesthetic Injury Without Actual Notice
In cases like Summers where the plaintiff has not received
actual notice of an injury-causing event, the majority's requirement
of imminent harm with specific future plans is too high of a burden
for a plaintiff to prove. Without notice, potential plaintiffs cannot
know for certain whether their travels will bring them to the exact
location of an injury-causing event. 242
A plaintiff who knew of the location where the Forest Service
planned to execute projects could provide more detailed allegations
of aesthetic injuries. Without notice from the Forest Service,
potential plaintiffs cannot provide the Summers majority with the
requisite information to establish injury in fact because they cannot
prove, in certain terms, that during their trips to national forests
they will come upon a Forest Service project. Without notice of
proposed Forest Service projects, the majority's imminent-harm
test places too heavy a burden on potential plaintiffs to prove that
aesthetic injuries will result from their travels.
This lack of notice presents problems not only in the context of
the Forest Service, but also in situations where there is no
administrative body to give notice or where there is no specific
event of which to give notice. In Massachusetts, the erosion of the
coastline did not result from one particular event that an
administrative agency could announce to the public.243 In this
situation, Massachusetts could not demonstrate one specific action
by the EPA that would increase the erosion of the coastline. Under
the Summers majority's test, Massachusetts could not provide
enough specific proof of future harm to satisfy the imminent-harm
241. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 169, at 6.
242. The dissent in Summers provided an illustration of this problem, stating:
"To know, virtually for certain, that snow will fall in New England this winter is
not to know the name of each particular town where it is bound to arrive."
Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1157 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

243. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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test. 2 44 As illustrated by the regulatory exclusions of public notice
in Summers and by situations where notice cannot be given, the
majority's imminent-threat test is inapplicable because it asks an
impossible task of potential plaintiffs-in these situations,
potential plaintiffs cannot provide the requisite proof of injury in
fact.
At the same time, the Summers dissent's request that a plaintiff
show a realistic threat without actual travel plans is too low of a
threshold for a potential plaintiff to meet. Without actually visiting
the national forest where the event will occur, a potential plaintiff
cannot be injured by the Forest Service's projects. However,
because plaintiffs in cases like Summers want to challenge projects
as preventative measures for future harm and do not have actual
injuries to raise in their complaints, the plaintiffs must demonstrate
that they will likely be injured in the future. Potential plaintiffs
with actual plans to visit the location where the injury will occur
are more likely to suffer an injury than potential plaintiffs who do
not plan to visit a national forest. At the same time, without notice
from the Forest Service of future projects, a potential plaintiff
cannot know if he or she will come in contact with a project while
visiting a national forest. Under the current Forest Service
regulations that exempt certain projects from public notice, 245 the
dissent provides a more equitable test for establishing standing to
sue. Without the information needed to allege the injuries required
by the majority, the dissent's broader test provides potential
plaintiffs with an actual opportunity to establish standing.
However, the dissent does not articulate the best test for aesthetic
injury in fact.
Because of the deficiencies in the majority and dissent's
respective tests, courts must adopt a new test: the realistic-threatwith-actual-plans test. By requiring a realistic threat in conjunction
with actual plans of an organization member, environmental
organizations have an opportunity to establish standing but at the
same time, the requirements are not too easy to meet. This hybrid
test combines the strengths of both the majority and the dissent's
tests. Under this test, potential plaintiffs must demonstrate a
realistic threat of harm through actual plans to be where the injury
will likely occur. "Actual plans" in this sense does not mean that a
potential plaintiff must go on an elaborate trip. Plans could simply
mean, for example, that a plaintiff demonstrates that he walks by a
river every day and that this river is at risk of pollution from a new
chemical plant built on the river. Under the facts of Summers,
244. See supra Part II.B.
245. See supra Part III.A.
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affiant Bensman could allege that he plans to visit the Allegheny
National Forest on four specified weekends in the future. These
plans, coupled with the Forest Service's admission that
"thousands" more projects exempt from notice will occur in the
future, demonstrate a situation where the plaintiff faces a realistic
threat of injury.
Without notice of injury-causing events, plaintiffs cannot
provide the detailed plans required by the majority in Summers to
establish standing. Although this hybrid realistic-threat-withactual-plans test takes into account the absence of notice, it does
not meet all the procedural needs of plaintiffs like those in
Summers. Potential plaintiffs still need to regain their procedural
rights to notice, comment, and appeal. Because the procedural
device of notice determines which aesthetic injury test to apply,
environmental groups must have an opportunity to litigate their
procedural injuries so that they can then challenge their aesthetic
injuries in the future.
2. The ProceduralInjury Test
As seen above, procedural devices like public notice, comment,
and appeal directly affect a potential plaintiffs ability to
demonstrate aesthetic injury in fact-with notice, plaintiffs can
allege specific injuries in fact. In addition to this effect on aesthetic
injury a procedural injury can serve as an injury in fact in its own
right. 6 The Court in Summers, however, failed to afford the
plaintiff organizations' procedural injury its own analysis.2 4 7
Additionally, courts must analyze a procedural injury in an
individualized manner because of its effect on the analysis of
aesthetic injuries. In these instances, a court must first determine
whether a plaintiff had notice of a potential injury-causing event to
know which aesthetic injury test to apply.24 If a court analyzes
procedural and aesthetic injuries in the same manner, the
significance of notice is lost.
Courts should analyze the procedural injury of not having the
opportunity for notice, comment, and appeal with a procedural due
process-like balancing test. Although an actual procedural due
process claim is not available to plaintiffs raising these procedural
injuries because the injury affects all United States citizens and not

246. See supra Part II.A. For example, an environmental organization could
have facially challenged the Forest Service regulations.
247. See supra Part IV.A. 1.
248. See supra Part IV.B. 1.
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just a specific individual,2 4 9 the elements of a procedural due
process balancing test should be adapted into a new test to
determine if a procedural injury is an injury in fact for the purpose
of standing.
The procedural injury-in-fact test derives from Justice Powell's
majority opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge.2 5 0 Justice Powell
explained that courts should consider three "distinct factors" when
analyzing procedural due process: (1) the interest of the person
"affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of erroneous
deprivation" of a personal interest because of the procedures used
by the government; and (3) the government's interest, which takes
into account "the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail." 25 1
This procedural due process test can be adapted into a threefactor balancing test of competing interests to determine
procedural injury in fact: (1) the potential plaintiffs procedural
rights; (2) any other rights of the plaintiff that could be affected by
the government's procedural regulations; and (3) the government's
interest, which includes fiscal and administrative efficiency. If a
court determines that the plaintiffs interests outweigh the
government's interests, then the plaintiff has demonstrated
sufficient procedural injury to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of
the three-part standing test. When the government's interests
outweigh the plaintiff's interests, the plaintiff has not met the
burden of proving injury in fact.
Applying this balancing test to the facts of Summers
demonstrates that the Court decided the case incorrectly. The
plaintiffs procedural interest in Summers was the right to notice,
comment, and appeal of proposed projects of the Forest Service
under the ARA. When first passed in 1992, the ARA "required the
Forest Service to establish a notice, comment and appeal process"
for proposed projects.25 2 However, when the Forest Service passed
regulations to circumvent the ARA and exempt from notice,
comment, and appeal any fire-rehabilitation projects on less than
4,200 acres or any timber sales on less than 250 acres, United
States citizens lost their procedural rights to notice, comment, and

appeal. 25 3

249. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
250. Id. This case was chosen as a basis for a procedural injury test because
of its importance in administrative law, and procedural injuries often arise in
administrative law. See supra Part II.A.
251. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
252. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1147 (2009).

253. Id.
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In addition to protecting these specific procedural rights under
the ARA, potential plaintiffs also have a substantial interest in
having access to the judicial system because their only other means
of relief is through the political process. Through the political
process, environmental organizations could lobby Congress to
amend the ARA to include a statutory grant of standing or to repeal
the 1992 Forest Service regulations. However, Congress may
refuse to entertain either suggestion. Furthermore, use of the
political process to regain the right to notice, comment, and appeal
is not as efficient as bringing suit. The political process takes time
and resources that small environmental organizations may not
have. Therefore, it is imperative that these environmental
organizations at least have access to the courts, through an ability
to establish standing, to challenge their members' procedural
injuries.
Although the government's interest in limiting notice,
comment, and appeal is not stated in Summers or in the amendment
to the regulations, the government might have an interest in saving
time and money by not reporting every Forest Service project.
Although agency efficiency is a legitimate governmental interest,
this interest does not outweigh the rights of citizens to have the
opportunity to receive notice of, to comment on, and to appeal
proposed Forest Service projects that may injure them
aesthetically. Because notice and the opportunity to be heard form
the foundation of procedural due process,254 a plaintiff's
procedural interests in having access to public notice, comment,
and appeal outweigh the government's interests in administrative
efficiency. Applying this test of competing interests to the facts of
Summers, the plaintiff organizations would have standing to
challenge their procedural injuries resulting from the Forest
Service regulations that prevent the opportunity for notice,
comment, and appeal.
The Supreme Court's inconsistent jurisprudential history in the
realm of environmental standing 255 demonstrates the need to
reconsider how the Court analyzes standing to sue. As illustrated in
Summers, the application of the current three-part test prevented
environmental organizations from establishing standing to
challenge their aesthetic and procedural injuries. Although the
Summers majority's imminent-threat test required too much
254. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950) ("[T]here can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.").
255. See supra Part II.B.
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specification from potential plaintiffs in order to demonstrate an
injury in fact, the dissent's realistic-threat test failed to require
enough specificity from potential plaintiffs. Because of these
weaknesses in the injury-in-fact tests presented in Summers, the
Court should adopt new analyses for determining injury in fact.
The proposed injury-in-fact tests provide potential plaintiffs with
more equitable opportunities to establish standing than under the
current injury-in-fact prong of the three-part standing test.
V. CONCLUSION
Summers demonstrates the need to reconsider the application of
the injury-in-fact prong of the three-part standing test for both
aesthetic and procedural injuries. Potential plaintiffs must have an
opportunity to challenge their procedural injuries because of the
impact that notice of injury has on plaintiffs' abilities to
demonstrate aesthetic injuries in fact. By finding a middle ground
between the majority and dissenting opinions in Summers and
taking into account a potential plaintiffs ability to receive notice,
plaintiffs like Earth Island Institute will have an opportunity to
meet the requirements to establish standing to sue. The proposed
tests in this Note provide potential plaintiffs with the prospect of
establishing standing where before they had no opportunity to
challenge projects that harm the environment.
MargaretMcDonald
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